Bibliografia completa
Psychology between science and common sense: William James and the problems of psychological language in the Principles
Tipo de recurso
Autor ou contribuidor
- Araújo, Saulo de Freitas (Autor)
Título
Psychology between science and common sense: William James and the problems of psychological language in the Principles
Resumo
The suspicion that language can become an obstacle to human knowledge is not new in the Western intellectual tradition. Following the empiricist legacy, many authors have suggested the perils and pitfalls of common sense language for science. Applied to psychology, this leads to the issue of the reliability of psychological language for scientific psychology. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, was one of the first psychologists to address this problem explicitly. The goal of this paper is to situate his position and contrast it with contemporary debates over the status of folk psychology. The results indicate that James conceived of common sense psychology in a very complex manner, and pointed to a kind of illusion that remains ignored in the current literature, with negative consequences for psychology. I conclude by suggesting the relevance of James for contemporary debates in theoretical and philosophical psychology.
Título da publicação
New Ideas in Psychology
Volume
46
Páginas
39-45
Data
08-2017
Abreviatura do periódico
New Ideas in Psychology
Idioma
Inglês
ISSN
0732118X
Título curto
Psychology between science and common sense
Data de acesso
28/08/2023 12:23
Catálogo de biblioteca
DOI.org (Crossref)
Citation 'apa'
Araújo, S. de F. (2017). Psychology between science and common sense: William James and the problems of psychological language in the Principles. New Ideas in Psychology, 46, 39–45. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2016.10.001
Citation 'abnt'
ARAÚJO, S. DE F. Psychology between science and common sense: William James and the problems of psychological language in the Principles. New Ideas in Psychology, v. 46, p. 39–45, 2017.
Ligação para este recurso