Searle’s New Mystery, or, How Not to Solve the Problem of Consciousness

Tipo de recurso
Autor ou contribuidor
Título
Searle’s New Mystery, or, How Not to Solve the Problem of Consciousness
Resumo
John Searle repeatedly claims to have offered a solution to the mind-brain problem, especially as regards the mystery of consciousness. The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Searle’s theory of biological naturalism, from its earliest expression in the 1980s to his most recent works. Our analysis shows that Searle’s biological naturalism suffers from many theoretical difficulties and logical inconsistencies, which disqualify it as a sound explanation for consciousness and the mind-brain problem. We conclude that, far from offering a solution to the problem of consciousness, Searle ended up creating a new mystery of consciousness.
Título da publicação
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
Volume
4
Edição
1
Páginas
1-12
Data
2013
Idioma
Inglês
ISSN
2239-2629
Data de acesso
28/08/2023 12:23
Catálogo de biblioteca
DOI.org (CSL JSON)
Citation 'apa'
Araújo, S. de F. (2013). Searle’s New Mystery, or, How Not to Solve the Problem of Consciousness. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 4(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2013.0001
Citation 'abnt'
ARAÚJO, S. DE F. Searle’s New Mystery, or, How Not to Solve the Problem of Consciousness. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, v. 4, n. 1, p. 1–12, 2013.