A sua pesquisa

O pensamento psicológico de Christian Wolff constitui uma das mais significativas referências para o desenvolvimento conceitual e metodológico da psicologia a partir do século XVIII. Contudo, Wolff vem sendo ignorado na literatura psicológica, sobretudo no caso brasileiro. O objetivo do presente trabalho é apresentar a relação corpo-alma em seu pensamento psicológico, a partir da análise de seu primeiro tratado metafísico sistemático: a Metafísica Alemã (1720). É discutido, primeiramente, o lugar da questão em seu sistema, considerando dois níveis de análise: o empírico e o racional. Segue-se apresentando as três teorias ali discutidas: o influxo natural, a intervenção imediata de Deus e a harmonia pré-estabelecida. Por fim, é feita uma análise de algumas relações entre esta última e o sistema wolffiano.

Embora seja geralmente louvado nos manuais de história da psicologia como fundador da psicologia científica, grande parte da obra de Wilhelm Wundt permanece desconhecida por parte dos psicólogos contemporâneos, sobretudo no que diz respeito à relação entre filosofia e seu pensamento psicológico. O presente artigo pretende apresentar uma visão geral dos pressupostos filosóficos envolvidos na fundamentação do projeto wundtiano de uma psicologia científica. Após uma breve contextualização geral de sua obra e a exposição de alguns problemas de interpretação na literatura contemporânea, são enfatizadas as concepções de objeto e método da psicologia. Além disso, são apresentados dois princípios fundamentais de seu projeto psicológico, a saber, o princípio do paralelismo psicofísico e o princípio da síntese criadora. Ao final, alguns mal-entendidos são desfeitos, sugerindo a atualidade do pensamento de Wundt para os debates contemporâneos na psicologia.

William James made many references to pluralism throughout his career. Interestingly, many contemporary psychologists also discuss pluralism and indeed call for pluralism as a corrective to the discipline's philosophical and methodological foundations. Yet, pluralism and the purposes to which it is applied are understood in a variety of ways, and the relation of contemporary pluralism to the pluralism(s) of William James is uncertain. This book offers conceptual clarification in both contexts, first distinguishing diverse senses of pluralism in psychology and then systematically examining different forms of pluralism across the writings of James. A comparison of meanings and analysis of implications follows, aimed at illuminating what is at stake in ongoing calls for pluralism in psychology.

Este artigo alinha-se com estudos anteriores que avaliam o impacto da obra de J. B. Watson no início do século XX, mas busca superar certos impasses metodológicos que poderiam limitar a interpretação de seus dados, como a ausência de parâmetros comparativos. Com este objetivo, citações de Watson foram comparadas com citações de outros oito relevantes psicólogos, em oito periódicos, na década entre 1924 e 1933. Os resultados desta análise bibliométrica são comparados com dados de estudos pregressos, de modo a complementar, corroborar ou contestar suas conclusões. No período examinado, ainda se observa uma tendência de ampliação do impacto da obra de Watson já verificada ao longo da década imediatamente posterior à publicação do Manifesto Behaviorista (1913). O impacto de Watson continua próximo ao de Dewey e de Titchener, já supera o de Thorndike, segue maior em comparação com Angell, Carr, Cattell e Hall, mas ainda distante em relação a James.

According to many authors, we live in a post-truth era, to the extent that truth has become subordinated to politics. This has implications not only to political debates, but also to science, technology, and common sense thinking. In this paper, I claim that William James’s conception of truth may shed new light on the contemporary post-truth debate. First, I will present the essential elements of James’s initial position. Then, I will discuss some of his amendments to clarify and improve his theory to avoid misunderstandings. Finally, I will address his potential contributions to the contemporary post-truth debate, and consider whether there are special implications for psychology.

Entre psicólogos, filósofos e historiadores não há consenso sobre o início da psicologia como ciência. Muitas vezes, parece haver nesses debates uma confusão entre o nome "psicologia" e a coisa por ele designada. Neste caso, a questão central é saber se a existência da coisa depende ou não do nome. Nosso objetivo é mostrar a insuficiência do nome "psicologia" para designar a coisa. Mais especificamente, defendemos a existência da coisa muito antes do surgimento do nome. Inicialmente, analisamos as investigações sobre a psykhé na tradição grega. Em seguida, abordamos a constituição de uma ciência da alma entre a Idade Média Tardia e o início do período moderno. Acompanhamos também o surgimento do nome "psicologia" e as distintas coisas por ele nomeadas até o estabelecimento do projeto de uma ciência psicológica em Christian Wolff e suas consequências. Finalmente, discutimos as implicações de nossa investigação para o debate sobre as origens da psicologia como ciência.

Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (b. 1832―d. 1920) was a central figure in German culture between the second half of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century. Coming from a medical and neurophysiological background with a PhD in medicine, Wundt shifted his interest toward psychological and philosophical questions, becoming full professor of philosophy: first, at the University of Zurich in 1874; then, at the University of Leipzig in 1875. In the early 21st century, he is known worldwide as one of the founders of scientific psychology. In Leipzig, he founded in 1879 the Psychological Laboratory, which later became the first psychological institute in the world. Moreover, he founded the first journal for experimental psychology, which he called Philosophische Studien (Philosophical Studies), later Psychologische Studien (Psychological Studies). In so doing, he created the first international training center for psychologists, attracting to Leipzig students from all over the world. Wundt had a significant impact upon the development of scientific psychology in many countries, not least in the United States, where his former students founded psychological laboratories inspired by the Leipzig model. Apart from his contributions to psychology, Wundt also developed a philosophical system that is crucial to understanding his psychological program and methodology, but which has not received due attention among psychologists. Wundt’s writings have been published in different, mostly enlarged editions throughout his career. The great majority of these volumes have not yet been translated into English, and the same holds true for much of the relevant research literature.

On the occasion of the centenary of Wilhelm Wundt’s death (1832–1920), we had a conversation with Saulo de Freitas Araujo on the works and influence of the German author. After a brief introduction, the conversation begins with a reflection on the aims and objectives of Araujo’s work on the history and philosophy of Wundt’s psychology. A philosophical approach to the history of science and of psychology is then described. After considering the social and intellectual context of the revival of Wundt scholarship during the 1970s, Wundt’s philosophical and psychological project is discussed. The conversation ends with general reflections on Wundt’s legacy to recent and contemporary psychology.

Contemporary Argentinian psychology has a unique characteristic: it is identified with psychoanalysis. Nonpsychoanalytic theories and therapies are difficult to find. In addition, there is an overt antiscientific attitude within many psychology programs. How should this be explained? In this paper, we claim that a philosophical history of psychology can shed new light on the development of Argentinian psychology by showing that early Argentinian psychoanalysts held positions in the newborn psychology programs and a distinctive stance toward scientific research in general and psychology in particular. In the absence of an explicit and articulate philosophical position, psychoanalysts developed an implicit meta-theory that helped shape the context that led to the institutionalization and professionalization of psychology in Argentina. Although we do not establish or even suggest a monocausal link between their ideas and the current state of Argentinian psychology, we do claim that their impact should be explored. Finally, we discuss some limitations of our study and suggest future complementary investigations.

James’s work is admittedly cross-disciplinary to the extent that it defies traditional scholarly boundaries. One of the best examples is the cross-fertilization between his philosophical and psychological ideas, although the precise relation between them is not easy to frame. Notwithstanding this difficulty, one can say that James’s early psychology, developed between the 1870s and 1880s, illuminates many aspects of his later philosophical positions, including pragmatism, radical empiricism, and pluralism. First, James defends the teleological nature of mind, which is driven by subjective interests and goals that cannot be explained by the immediate interchange with the external environment. They are spontaneous variations that constitute the a priori, properly active nature of the human mind. This idea helps him not only explain important features of scientific and philosophical theories, but also reject certain philosophical doctrines such as materialism, determinism, agnosticism, and so on. It represents, so to speak, the relevance of the subjective method for deciding moral and metaphysical issues. Second, James claims that certain temperaments underlie the choice of philosophical systems. Thus, both pragmatism and pluralism can be seen as philosophical expressions of subjective influences. In the first case, pragmatism expresses a temperament that combines and harmonizes the tender-minded and the tough-minded. In the second, pluralism reflects the sympathetic temperament in contrast with the cynical character drawn to materialism. Finally, James proposes a distinction between the substantive and the transitive parts of consciousness, meaning that consciousness has clearly distinguishable aspects as well as more obscure points, although human beings tend to focus only on the first part, ignoring the other. This idea plays a decisive role in the elaboration of radical empiricism. Such illustrations, far from exhausting the relations between James’s psychology and philosophy, invite new insights and further scholarship.

Apesar do crescente interesse despertado pela figura de Christian Wolff nas últimas décadas, a compreensão de seu pensamento ainda enfrenta obstáculos e desafios. De um lado, na história da filosofia, não é raro encontrarmos um Wolff compreendido a partir de Kant. De outro, na história da psicologia, pode-se falar de uma estranha negligência do papel exercido por Wolff no desenvolvimento de uma ciência psicológica autônoma, especialmente na tradição alemã, que vai culminar na separação radical entre filosofia e psicologia a partir do século XX. O objetivo deste artigo é situar historicamente o projeto wolffiano de uma ciência da alma, mostrando não só o seu sentido específico, mas também suas principais contribuições e algumas de suas consequências para o posterior desenvolvimento da psicologia alemã nos séculos XVIII e XIX. Finalmente, vamos indicar alguns desafios e possíveis caminhos para investigações futuras.

Tanto a ideia de uma psicologia experimental quanto a realização de experimentos psicológicos já estão presentes no século 18. Contudo, é no século 19, primeiramente nas universidades alemãs, que a psicologia experimental adquire um novo estatuto, marcando fortemente a identidade da nova psicologia. O objetivo do presente artigo é apresentar uma reflexão de caráter histórico-filosófico sobre a natureza da psicologia experimental, com base nas contribuições de Fechner, Wundt e James. Depois de apresentar sua dimensão histórica, discutimos sua relação com a psicologia experimental contemporânea, no sentido de esclarecer se elas podem iluminar de alguma forma seu caminho futuro. Concluímos que um diálogo efetivo depende da modificação de certas condições estruturais do modelo atual de formação do psicólogo.

“Methodological behaviorism” is a term that frequently appears in the behavioristic literature, but one accompanied by considerable semantic confusion: the term is used to denote very different theoretical positions and the authors classified as methodological behaviorists are many and various. In order to understand the polysemic character of this term, we propose a historical analysis of its origins and development in the literature from the 50 years following its first appearance in 1923. The results reveal that it has been used by authors as diverse as Karl Lashley, B. F. Skinner, Herbert Feigl, and Gustav Bergmann. Moreover, it has been defined in terms of two central features (one a methodological assumption and the other a metaphysical one) and used to demarcate positive and negative forms of behaviorism, depending on how each author has understood those features and forms. We conclude that the term’s polysemic character and different uses can be traced back to its roots in the 1920s, which helps us to understand the semantic confusion in the contemporary literature.

Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) is one of the most famous names in the history of psychology. After passing into oblivion for nearly 60 years, in recent decades he has been celebrated in general psychology textbooks as the founding father of scientific psychology. However, this traditional portrait is incomplete and can lead to misunderstandings, as his psychological program is primarily understood in terms of experimental psychology. In order to complete this traditional picture, two aspects of his work must be emphasized and clarified: the role of Völkerpsychologie as the counterpart of experimental or individual psychology, and the interaction between his psychological program and his philosophical project. The ultimate meaning of Wundt’s conception of scientific psychology cannot be understood in isolation from his broader philosophical goals. Reading Wundt from the point of view of such interaction offers a deeper understanding of his work.

Most of the psychology programs in Brazil have mandatory courses on the history and foundations of psychology, whatever names such courses may receive. In any case, Brazilian psychology students are supposed to acquire knowledge about the historical development of psychological theories and psychology as a science and profession, which would allow them to adopt a critical perspective toward their own theoretical and practical choices.