A sua pesquisa

On the occasion of the centenary of Wilhelm Wundt’s death (1832–1920), we had a conversation with Saulo de Freitas Araujo on the works and influence of the German author. After a brief introduction, the conversation begins with a reflection on the aims and objectives of Araujo’s work on the history and philosophy of Wundt’s psychology. A philosophical approach to the history of science and of psychology is then described. After considering the social and intellectual context of the revival of Wundt scholarship during the 1970s, Wundt’s philosophical and psychological project is discussed. The conversation ends with general reflections on Wundt’s legacy to recent and contemporary psychology.

Contemporary Argentinian psychology has a unique characteristic: it is identified with psychoanalysis. Nonpsychoanalytic theories and therapies are difficult to find. In addition, there is an overt antiscientific attitude within many psychology programs. How should this be explained? In this paper, we claim that a philosophical history of psychology can shed new light on the development of Argentinian psychology by showing that early Argentinian psychoanalysts held positions in the newborn psychology programs and a distinctive stance toward scientific research in general and psychology in particular. In the absence of an explicit and articulate philosophical position, psychoanalysts developed an implicit meta-theory that helped shape the context that led to the institutionalization and professionalization of psychology in Argentina. Although we do not establish or even suggest a monocausal link between their ideas and the current state of Argentinian psychology, we do claim that their impact should be explored. Finally, we discuss some limitations of our study and suggest future complementary investigations.

James’s work is admittedly cross-disciplinary to the extent that it defies traditional scholarly boundaries. One of the best examples is the cross-fertilization between his philosophical and psychological ideas, although the precise relation between them is not easy to frame. Notwithstanding this difficulty, one can say that James’s early psychology, developed between the 1870s and 1880s, illuminates many aspects of his later philosophical positions, including pragmatism, radical empiricism, and pluralism. First, James defends the teleological nature of mind, which is driven by subjective interests and goals that cannot be explained by the immediate interchange with the external environment. They are spontaneous variations that constitute the a priori, properly active nature of the human mind. This idea helps him not only explain important features of scientific and philosophical theories, but also reject certain philosophical doctrines such as materialism, determinism, agnosticism, and so on. It represents, so to speak, the relevance of the subjective method for deciding moral and metaphysical issues. Second, James claims that certain temperaments underlie the choice of philosophical systems. Thus, both pragmatism and pluralism can be seen as philosophical expressions of subjective influences. In the first case, pragmatism expresses a temperament that combines and harmonizes the tender-minded and the tough-minded. In the second, pluralism reflects the sympathetic temperament in contrast with the cynical character drawn to materialism. Finally, James proposes a distinction between the substantive and the transitive parts of consciousness, meaning that consciousness has clearly distinguishable aspects as well as more obscure points, although human beings tend to focus only on the first part, ignoring the other. This idea plays a decisive role in the elaboration of radical empiricism. Such illustrations, far from exhausting the relations between James’s psychology and philosophy, invite new insights and further scholarship.

Apesar do crescente interesse despertado pela figura de Christian Wolff nas últimas décadas, a compreensão de seu pensamento ainda enfrenta obstáculos e desafios. De um lado, na história da filosofia, não é raro encontrarmos um Wolff compreendido a partir de Kant. De outro, na história da psicologia, pode-se falar de uma estranha negligência do papel exercido por Wolff no desenvolvimento de uma ciência psicológica autônoma, especialmente na tradição alemã, que vai culminar na separação radical entre filosofia e psicologia a partir do século XX. O objetivo deste artigo é situar historicamente o projeto wolffiano de uma ciência da alma, mostrando não só o seu sentido específico, mas também suas principais contribuições e algumas de suas consequências para o posterior desenvolvimento da psicologia alemã nos séculos XVIII e XIX. Finalmente, vamos indicar alguns desafios e possíveis caminhos para investigações futuras.

Tanto a ideia de uma psicologia experimental quanto a realização de experimentos psicológicos já estão presentes no século 18. Contudo, é no século 19, primeiramente nas universidades alemãs, que a psicologia experimental adquire um novo estatuto, marcando fortemente a identidade da nova psicologia. O objetivo do presente artigo é apresentar uma reflexão de caráter histórico-filosófico sobre a natureza da psicologia experimental, com base nas contribuições de Fechner, Wundt e James. Depois de apresentar sua dimensão histórica, discutimos sua relação com a psicologia experimental contemporânea, no sentido de esclarecer se elas podem iluminar de alguma forma seu caminho futuro. Concluímos que um diálogo efetivo depende da modificação de certas condições estruturais do modelo atual de formação do psicólogo.

“Methodological behaviorism” is a term that frequently appears in the behavioristic literature, but one accompanied by considerable semantic confusion: the term is used to denote very different theoretical positions and the authors classified as methodological behaviorists are many and various. In order to understand the polysemic character of this term, we propose a historical analysis of its origins and development in the literature from the 50 years following its first appearance in 1923. The results reveal that it has been used by authors as diverse as Karl Lashley, B. F. Skinner, Herbert Feigl, and Gustav Bergmann. Moreover, it has been defined in terms of two central features (one a methodological assumption and the other a metaphysical one) and used to demarcate positive and negative forms of behaviorism, depending on how each author has understood those features and forms. We conclude that the term’s polysemic character and different uses can be traced back to its roots in the 1920s, which helps us to understand the semantic confusion in the contemporary literature.

Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) is one of the most famous names in the history of psychology. After passing into oblivion for nearly 60 years, in recent decades he has been celebrated in general psychology textbooks as the founding father of scientific psychology. However, this traditional portrait is incomplete and can lead to misunderstandings, as his psychological program is primarily understood in terms of experimental psychology. In order to complete this traditional picture, two aspects of his work must be emphasized and clarified: the role of Völkerpsychologie as the counterpart of experimental or individual psychology, and the interaction between his psychological program and his philosophical project. The ultimate meaning of Wundt’s conception of scientific psychology cannot be understood in isolation from his broader philosophical goals. Reading Wundt from the point of view of such interaction offers a deeper understanding of his work.

Most of the psychology programs in Brazil have mandatory courses on the history and foundations of psychology, whatever names such courses may receive. In any case, Brazilian psychology students are supposed to acquire knowledge about the historical development of psychological theories and psychology as a science and profession, which would allow them to adopt a critical perspective toward their own theoretical and practical choices.

In recent decades, various studies have challenged the traditional view that John Broadus Watson's Behaviorist Manifesto prompted a psychological revolution. However, methodological hindrances underlie all these attempts to evaluate the impact of Watson's study, such as the absence of comparative parameters. This article remedies this problem by conducting a comparative citation analysis involving Watson and eight other representative psychologists of the time: J. R. Angell, H. Carr, J. M. Cattell, J. Dewey, G. S. Hall, W. James, E. L. Thorndike, and E. B. Titchener. Eight important American journals were scrutinized for the period between 1903 and 1923, a decade before and a decade after the publication of Watson's Manifesto. The results suggest that even if Watson's study cannot be taken as revolutionary, it had an impact between 1914 and 1923 that was close to Dewey's, Titchener's, and Thorndike's and higher than Angell's, Carr's, Cattell's, and Hall's, although distant from James's. Finally, some methodological implications of this study are discussed.