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After its foundation, the Laboratory for Experimental Psychology at Leipzig University became an international center for psychological research, attracting students from all over the world. The Russian physiologist and psychiatrist Vladimir Bekhterev (1857–1927) was one of Wilhelm Wundt's students in 1885, and after returning to Russia he continued enthusiastically his experimental research on mental phenomena. However, he gradually distanced himself from Wundt's psychological project and developed a new concept of psychology: the so-called Objective Psychology or Psychoreflexology. The goal of this paper is to analyze Bekhterev's position in relation to Wundt's experimental psychology, by showing how the former came to reject the latter's conception of psychology. The results indicate that Bekhterev's development of a philosophical program, including his growing interest in establishing a new Weltanschauung is the main reason behind his divergence with Wundt, which is reflected in his conception of scientific psychology. Despite this, Wundt remained alive in Bekhterev's mind as an ideal counterpoint.
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Recent transformations in the history of science and the philosophy of science have led historians of psychology to raise questions about the future development of their historiography. Although there is a dominant tendency among them to view their discipline as related to the social turn in the history of science, there is no consensus over how to approach the history of psychology methodologically. The aim of this article is to address the issue of the future of the historiography of psychology by proposing an alternative but complementary path for the field, which I call a philosophical history of psychology. In order to achieve this goal, I will first present and discuss the emergence of the social turn in the history of psychology, showing some of its problems. I will then introduce the contemporary debate about the integration of the history of science and the philosophy of science as an alternative model for the history of psychology. Finally, I will propose general guidelines for a philosophical history of psychology, discussing some of its possible advantages and limitations.
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Tanto a ideia de uma psicologia experimental quanto a realização de experimentos psicológicos já estão presentes no século 18. Contudo, é no século 19, primeiramente nas universidades alemãs, que a psicologia experimental adquire um novo estatuto, marcando fortemente a identidade da nova psicologia. O objetivo do presente artigo é apresentar uma reflexão de caráter histórico-filosófico sobre a natureza da psicologia experimental, com base nas contribuições de Fechner, Wundt e James. Depois de apresentar sua dimensão histórica, discutimos sua relação com a psicologia experimental contemporânea, no sentido de esclarecer se elas podem iluminar de alguma forma seu caminho futuro. Concluímos que um diálogo efetivo depende da modificação de certas condições estruturais do modelo atual de formação do psicólogo.
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In my rejoinder, I show how Brock’s and Burman’s replies to my article (Araujo, 2017) are based on a series of misunderstandings and misattributions. First, I argue that Brock ignores crucial passages of my article and my related book, and show not only that he misunderstands Wundt’s position on the introspective method, but also that his claim, according to which there is nothing new in my approach, lacks substance. Second, I argue that Burman’s text fails to make contact with the substantive thrust of my paper, and that his appeal to contextualism is vague and does not address the substantive questions I raise. Finally, I conclude that Brock’s rejection of my proposal, as well as his misunderstandings and misattributions, derives from a kind of methodological dogmatism, against which the best medicine is methodological pluralism, and that Burman’s worries are unjustified and can be avoided by a careful reading of my paper.
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The suspicion that language can become an obstacle to human knowledge is not new in the Western intellectual tradition. Following the empiricist legacy, many authors have suggested the perils and pitfalls of common sense language for science. Applied to psychology, this leads to the issue of the reliability of psychological language for scientific psychology. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, was one of the first psychologists to address this problem explicitly. The goal of this paper is to situate his position and contrast it with contemporary debates over the status of folk psychology. The results indicate that James conceived of common sense psychology in a very complex manner, and pointed to a kind of illusion that remains ignored in the current literature, with negative consequences for psychology. I conclude by suggesting the relevance of James for contemporary debates in theoretical and philosophical psychology.
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According to many authors, we live in a post-truth era, to the extent that truth has become subordinated to politics. This has implications not only to political debates, but also to science, technology, and common sense thinking. In this paper, I claim that William James’s conception of truth may shed new light on the contemporary post-truth debate. First, I will present the essential elements of James’s initial position. Then, I will discuss some of his amendments to clarify and improve his theory to avoid misunderstandings. Finally, I will address his potential contributions to the contemporary post-truth debate, and consider whether there are special implications for psychology.
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Apesar do crescente interesse despertado pela figura de Christian Wolff nas últimas décadas, a compreensão de seu pensamento ainda enfrenta obstáculos e desafios. De um lado, na história da filosofia, não é raro encontrarmos um Wolff compreendido a partir de Kant. De outro, na história da psicologia, pode-se falar de uma estranha negligência do papel exercido por Wolff no desenvolvimento de uma ciência psicológica autônoma, especialmente na tradição alemã, que vai culminar na separação radical entre filosofia e psicologia a partir do século XX. O objetivo deste artigo é situar historicamente o projeto wolffiano de uma ciência da alma, mostrando não só o seu sentido específico, mas também suas principais contribuições e algumas de suas consequências para o posterior desenvolvimento da psicologia alemã nos séculos XVIII e XIX. Finalmente, vamos indicar alguns desafios e possíveis caminhos para investigações futuras.
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Wilhelm Wundt’s biography is one of the main domains in Wundt scholarship that deserves more detailed attention. The few existing biographical works present many problems, ranging from vagueness to chronological inaccuracies, among others. One of the important gaps concerns the so-called Heidelberg period (1852–1874), during which he went from being a medical student to holding a professorship at the University of Heidelberg. The aim of this article is to dispel a very common confusion in the secondary literature, which refers to Wundt’s assistantship with Helmholtz at the Physiological Institute, by establishing the precise dates of his assistantship. Contrary to what is generally repeated in the secondary literature, the primary sources allow us to determine precisely this period from October 1858 to March 1865. I conclude by pointing out the indispensability of the primary sources not only to Wundt scholarship but also to the historiography of psychology in general.
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Most of the psychology programs in Brazil have mandatory courses on the history and foundations of psychology, whatever names such courses may receive. In any case, Brazilian psychology students are supposed to acquire knowledge about the historical development of psychological theories and psychology as a science and profession, which would allow them to adopt a critical perspective toward their own theoretical and practical choices.
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Despite the numerous and important contributions brought by Wundt scholarship in recent decades, some aspects of his work remain unclear and poorly understood. The aim of this paper is to explore one of these aspects, namely, the relationship between philosophy and psychology in Wundt's thought. To this end, we shall discuss an important yet neglected moment in Wundtian psychology, which remains unexplained to date: Why did Wundt abandon his early theory of the unconscious? According to the interpretation offered here, this can only be adequately explained by his intense philosophical studies in the period preceding the publication of the Grundzüge in 1874. Finally, we will point out some implications of this analysis to the general interpretation of Wundt's psychological project.
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Com o desenvolvimento, na segunda metade do século XX, das novas tecnologias de neuroimagem para estudar o funcionamento do cérebro humano, uma nova onda de entusiasmo com as explicações materialistas dos fenômenos mentais invadiu os departamentos de filosofia e psicologia em todo o mundo. O auge de tudo isso foi a assim chamada "década do cérebro" nos anos 1990. Entretanto, um exame mais detalhado dos argumentos apresentados por esses novos materialistas revela padrões recorrentes de analogias e metáforas, além de uma velha estratégia retórica de apelar para um futuro distante, no qual todos os problemas serão resolvidos. Este trabalho pretende mostrar que essas novas formas de materialismo repetem estratégias discursivas de versões mais arcaicas do pensamento materialista, sobretudo do materialismo francês do século XVIII e do materialismo alemão do século XIX. Finalmente, uma interpretação para o eterno retorno do materialismo será oferecida.
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Entre psicólogos, filósofos e historiadores não há consenso sobre o início da psicologia como ciência. Muitas vezes, parece haver nesses debates uma confusão entre o nome "psicologia" e a coisa por ele designada. Neste caso, a questão central é saber se a existência da coisa depende ou não do nome. Nosso objetivo é mostrar a insuficiência do nome "psicologia" para designar a coisa. Mais especificamente, defendemos a existência da coisa muito antes do surgimento do nome. Inicialmente, analisamos as investigações sobre a psykhé na tradição grega. Em seguida, abordamos a constituição de uma ciência da alma entre a Idade Média Tardia e o início do período moderno. Acompanhamos também o surgimento do nome "psicologia" e as distintas coisas por ele nomeadas até o estabelecimento do projeto de uma ciência psicológica em Christian Wolff e suas consequências. Finalmente, discutimos as implicações de nossa investigação para o debate sobre as origens da psicologia como ciência.
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